This Master’s thesis examines the content of a cooperation agreement using artificial intelligence, and whether the relationship pioneers the opportunity of jointly generate a supernormal profit qua relational rent. According to Dyer & Singh’s definition of relational rent, it can neither be generated by either firm in isolation nor be created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance partners. The thesis consists of three analytical chapters mutually providing a comprehensive assessment of how the cooperation partners’ choice of strategies affect the opportunity of achieving relational rent through strategic contracting. The first analysis investigates the legal concerns that the cooperation partners must take into account prior, during and after they enter into the agreement. A cooperation agreement is a framework agreement for future cooperation. Hence, it does not impose any explicit obligations on the parties for cooperation to lead to a particular result. However, the duty of loyalty is a legal norm that must be observed throughout the entire contract lifecycle. The second analysis aims to answer how the parties through their strategies and innovation can add value to the cooperation. If both parties honors altruism, they will regard cooperation as the dominant strategy since it would bring the largest personal payoff regardless of that the other player chose to do. Moreover, it will maximize the overall payoff, and thus change the overall payoff in the Prisoner’s dilemma. By conducting strategic behavior, companies can find new market opportunities through which innovation arises. In this way, further value is added to the cooperation. The focal point in the third analysis is the use of strategic contracting, which necessitate that the parties have the same generic strategy and achieve strategic fit. The relational rent can be considered as the overall goal in strategic contracting, which requires the cooperation agreement to contain elements of relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resources and capabilities, and effective governance. The fact that the parties jointly, through the cooperation agreement, can generate a supernormal profit harmonizes with both parties having cooperation as dominant strategy, i.e. following the same altruistic norm.
|Educations||MSc in Commercial Law, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis|
|Number of pages||106|