Optimizing the Collaboration Contracts With Consultancy Agencies: The Use of Incentive Structures to Increase the Relational Rent in the Partnership

August Yttergren Jakobsen

Student thesis: Master thesis

Abstract

Consultants are being hired by a vast majority of companies worldwide everyday, and they are being used in almost every industry imaginable. Consultants are usually hired to solve a problem within a company, and when the problem is solved they get paid for the hours they have spent on the project and then they move on to the next assigned project. This can in many situations be the efficient way of using consultants, but I think consultants can be used more efficiently This thesis is based on the hypothesis that there is an unused potential by not using strategic contracting in collaborating with consultancy agencies. Therefor this thesis seeks to examine and analyze how it is possible to optimize the contractual agreement made with consultancy agencies. This will be examined and analyzed by viewing if contracts based on incentives can be used to increase the relational rent between the cooperating companies. The thesis will be based on a case, where the consultancy agency will be outsourced to control the activities in the logistics department of a distribution company, and they will be paid in shares of the company if they complete the project successfully. By using incentives in contracts there is a probability of creating a more efficient contract. This can lead to the increase of relational rent in the partnership, which is the goal of using strategic contracting in this scenario.

EducationsMSc in Commercial Law, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis
LanguageDanish
Publication date2019
Number of pages83