This paper investigates how the implementation of identification of shareholder’s affects the excise of shareholder rights and active ownership in Danish stock listed companies. The long and complex chain of intermediaries between the stock listed company and the shareholder have resulted in a large number of invalid power of attorneys. This paper investigates how the implementation of identification of shareholders can prevent the large number of invalid power of attorneys and how the rules can give the shareholders an incentive to exercise their shareholder rights and exercise active ownership. Finally, this paper investigates how the optimal effect of the rules is achieved.
To analyse how the rules of identification of shareholders will effect the Danish rules of power of attorney, this paper is based on a legal analysis of the implementation of the rules in the Danish regulation. Additionally, analysis will be made whether the stock listed companies has an incentive to use the rules of identification of shareholders, and whether the shareholders has an incentive to exercise their shareholder rights and active ownership.
Finally, it is discussed if there are any barriers holding back the optimal effect of identification of shareholders and how the optimal effect of the rules is achieved.
The result shows that the Danish power of attorney rules are not changed as an effect of the implementation of identification of shareholders. The wished effect of minimizing the number of invalid power of attorneys is therefore not achieved. The result shows, that the companies have incentives to use the opportunity to identify its shareholders and that the shareholders have incentives to exercise active ownership. Finally, the result shows that there are barriers for the optimal effect of identification of shareholders, but an implementation in soft law, can result in a transparency in the use of the rules.
|Educations||MSc in Commercial Law, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis|
|Number of pages||75|