There has been a lot of focus on the accounting profession ever since the EU Commission published draft legislation, which consists of changes to the already existing directive and a new regulation, which only concerns the companies of public interest. This main thesis has as a main target to investigate different groups of Danish actors’ reaction to the draft legislation from the EU Commission in the perspective of both actor-network theory and regulation theory. The thesis begins by explaining why there is a need for auditing and for control of an auditor’s work by using the Principal-Agent theory. To understand how the Danish actors function in relation to each other, stakeholder theory and actor-network theory (ANT) is used. It is here shown how groups of actors start and develop networks to care for their own interests. Theory about expectations is used to show what the expectation gap is made of and finally regulation theory is used to see the different kinds of regulation that exists. As a part of gaining a holistic understanding, I’ve gone through the development of the regulation of the audit profession through the times. This is also done to show what episodes that made the legislature step in and regulate. In this section one can see that it is often the public corporate scandals that made the legislature increase the regulation. The section also clarifies the forward process of getting the draft legislation implemented and what changes the draft legislation will bring. The data basis which supports the thesis is mainly a seminar held by FSR on April 25th 2012 and the Danish responses to the Green Paper. The responses has been divided into categories and after analyzing them they’ve been patterned in table form to see the main interests of the groups of actors and where the groups of actors have the same interests. The groups with the same interests (not to burden the companies) are assessed to be in a network, which is made stronger by their common resistance against the draft legislation. Another common interest is to lower the expectation gap, and one can wonder why the main reaction from the legislature here always is to regulate more, when that only affect one part of the gap, especially when it seems it is the other part they want to affect. Finally in the main thesis I’ve gone through the purpose to why the EU Commission chooses increased regulation. In the early days there was complete confidence to the auditor and his work, but with the big corporate scandals the confidence was lost, and history has shown that it is partly regained by increase the regulation of the auditor. This has met a lot of resistance since the last directive hasn’t yet been completely implemented in a lot of countries in the EU, and some of the actors feel it would be more appropriate to analyze the impact of this before regulating more. The EU Commission’s objective of the draft legislature is, among other things, to increase confidence in the audit while getting business safely through the financial crisis and increase market growth. These two goals work against each other, since, according to the EU Commission it is necessary to increase cost for the businesses to maintain and enhance confidence in the auditor, which is not considerate for the businesses if they are to achieve growth opportunities in a time of crisis. EU Commission measures to increase confidence in the auditor can ultimately affect the quality of the audit itself as limitations to the auditor works against the objective to bring increased value to the companies.
|Educations||MSc in Auditing, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis|
|Number of pages||89|