Anvendelse af Strategisk Kontrahering på OPPkontrakter for opnåelse af Relational rents.

Abstract

This thesis focuses on whether strategic contracting of a PPP contract can lead to sustainable competitive advantage, based on Jeffery H. Dyer & Singh’s analytical framework. Furthermore, the thesis investigates whether procurement law sets limits to this. The paper starts with an ex ante analysis of whether it is possible for the public party, through a competitive dialogue, to screen the market in order to identify the private party that forms the strategic fit through the complementary resources. Next, the thesis focuses on whether the economic constraints of the PPP contract may bring about the necessary confidence and credibility in the relation, so that it is possible to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. Trust and credibility can be built through relations-specific investments and knowledge sharing. Subsequently, effective governance, ex post, will be analysed, including the form of governance that will be most effective for the regulation of this particular PPP contract. This form of governance must be able to handle subsequent events that the parties could not foresee ex ante, so that the PPP project can continue undeterred. One way of controlling how the governance can be used effectively, is through sharing of risks between the parties. The relationship must be strong enough to ensure that a change of contract is an option, but procurement law may put some limitations to this. Finally, we analyse whether the PPP contract meets Dyer & Singh's four cumulative conditions for obtaining inter-organizational sustainable competitive advantage in the form of relational rents. This must be weighed against the transaction costs that the PPP contract entails.