Corporate Compliance and Anti-corruption in Peru

Alonso Masias Carrere

Student thesis: Master thesis


In this master’s thesis project, I address the question ““How are Corporate Compliance & AntiCorruption programmes perceived by Peruvian companies?” by exploring the different motivations of implementation, as well as benefits, challenges and general effects that may be perceived by Peruvian companies, or companies operating in Peru. Additionally, I seek explanations and effects for the identified perceptions. For this, I employ a qualitative research design with a constructivist worldview, in which I use Peru as a critical case to study these programmes. I gather data about the Peruvian context, corruption, Corporate Compliance & Anti-Corruption programmes and the perceptions about these programmes from primary and secondary sources, including interviews with local subject-matter experts. The gathered perceptions are explained by applying different theories and supporting secondary sources. I conclude the following: First, the motivation behind implementing Corporate Compliance & Anti-Corruption programmes seem to come out from perceived coercive isomorphisms that make companies believe that, if they do not implement them, they are risking legal liability despite of the voluntary nature of these regulations. Institutional dualities further attribute to the perception that one needs to have these programmes in paper, but not in practice. Second, due to the perceived coercive pressures and institutional dualities, Corporate Compliance & Anti-Corruption programmes are often perceived as just mechanisms to mitigate legal risks, which affects the programme’s controls effectiveness. This is further shown in the perceived lack of adequate resource allocation and might be explained through Peruvian executives creating their own institutions that tolerate corruption to avoid uncertainty. Third, the perceived ongoing corporate corruption in Peru is facilitated by the design of Corporate Compliance and Anti-Corruption programmes, which are based on principal-agent relationships, perhaps because the Fraud Triangle theory is often used as starting point. Finally, even if Corporate Compliance & Anti-Corruption programmes would be designed addressing corruption as a structural and relational issue, they might still not necessarily be effective.

EducationsMSc in Business, Language and Culture - Business and Development Studies, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis
Publication date2018
Number of pages116