The purpose of this master’s thesis is to analyze the relationship between the Danish Financial Intelligence Unit called the Money Laundering Secretariat and the obliged entities in order to analyze the effectiveness of this inter partes relationship from a legal and economic point of view. The legal analysis investigates the considerations behind the Danish Money Laundering Act and section 29 of the Danish Money Laundering Act. Subsequently, the Danish legislation (is) compares(d) with the European legislation to include the 4th Money Laundering Directive and its purpose. The involvement of the EU legislation is completed to examine whether the Danish law is in accordance with the purpose set by EU legislation. The legal analysis concludes that section 29 in the Danish Money Laundering act does not focus to a sufficient degree on giving feedback regarding the applicability and follow-up of the reports from the obliged entities. Therefore, the Money Laundering Act fails to consider the risk-based approach that has been laid down in both the Danish Money Laundering Act and the 4th Money Laundering Directive. The economic analyses investigate the effect of regulating money laundering as an externality. Based on Oliver Williamson's transaction cost theory, it is examined that the regulation of money laundering has led to a new externality in the form of over-reporting based on the parties’ opportunistic behavior. In the article A Theory of “Crying Wolf”: The Economics of Money Laundering Enforcement by Előd Takáts, the center interest was on regulating the obliged entities. Therefore, it is investigated in more detail how it is possible to strengthen the relationship between the Money Laundering Secretariat and the obliged entities by involving both parties in the solution of the over-reporting externality. In this connection, a distinction is made between applying negotiation according to the Strong Coase theorem or taxation according to Pigou's appeal. The solution turns out to be that the legislation must be put together so that transaction costs are reduced, which is in line with the normative Coase theorem. Finally, based on the legal and economic analysis, it is examined how the relationship between the Money Laundering Secretariat and the obliged entities can be strengthened. The integrated analysis shows that it is necessary for the Money Laundering Secretariat to provide feedback. This must be done to strengthen the obliged entities’ knowledge of what they must be aware of. This means that the obliged entities can target their efforts and report simultaneously, which will be in line with the risk-based approach in a volatile area such as money laundering.
|Educations||MSc in Commercial Law, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis|
|Number of pages||131|
|Supervisors||Kalle Johannes Rose|