Assortment Tenders: Strategic Pricing and the Derivative Challenges

Arian Dzeladini & Fahad Anjum

Student thesis: Master thesis

Abstract

This thesis examines whether the Danish Procurement Act section 45 which allows public authorities to refer to product categories (assortment tenders) coherence with the EU Public Procurement Directive
(2014/24/EU) as the directive doesn’t include such a section. In addition to this the thesis seeks to investigate whether such procurement can cause strategic pricing from the tenderers. In conjunction with procurements where the public authorities refer to product categories the relevant forms of strategic pricing are examined.
Due to that the thesis finds that assortment tenders can cause strategic pricing from the tenderers it is from a legal point of view investigated whether the public authorities can intervene against such tenders. In conjunction with public authorities’ possible intervention against strategic pricing, the Danish Procurement Act section 169 and 137 are analyzed.
From an economic point of view, it is initially investigated which inter-partes collaboration challenges that can occur in assortment tenders. In correlation with the collaboration challenges it is examined whether a public authority can solve these using post contractual incentives.
Finally, it is investigated which measures a public authority can use to reduce the risk of strategic pricing. This investigation contains the implementation of different remedies, such as delivery obligation with and without a purchase obligation and the use of competitive procedure with negotiation and dynamic purchasing systems.

EducationsMSc in Commercial Law, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis
LanguageDanish
Publication date2020
Number of pages126
SupervisorsGrith Skovgaard Ølykke