This thesis focuses on opportunities and constraints for obtaining relational rents or quasi rents between debtors and an intermediary who jointly offer legal services via a digital platform using strategic contracting.
In the dissertation, Dyer and Singh's theory of relational behavior is analyzed supplemented by the possibilities of drafting proactive clauses in the partnership contract, which assess transaction costs in the exercise of strategic contracting.
The thesis concludes that Dyer and Singh's condition of complementary resources is a basic prerequisite in relation to the other conditions for obtaining relational rents. And that the condition of effective management is made redundant by appropriate security measures in the contract basis. In addition, relational rents can be obtained, alternatively quasi rents, by drafting a regular profit clause which includes subsequent contingent financial gains as a result of the contract. Prior transaction costs may limit the choice of strategic contracting, but transaction costs are self-sustaining over time.
It can be concluded that there are good opportunities for the debtors and an intermediary to create a strategic and value-creating partnership with the opportunity to create relationel rents subsidiary quasi rents due to their complementary resou supplemented by proactive and dynamic provisions such as a regular gain clause.
|Educations||MSc in Commercial Law, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis|
|Number of pages||120|