This thesis focus on the different matching markets and their mechanism. A matching market is a market in which prices don’t do all the work. More preciously matching markets are markets in which you can’t just choose what you want even if you can afford it. You also have to be chosen. By looking at different properties such as, efficiency, strategy-proofness, fairness and stability, this thesis introduces the theoretical background behind and how especially Kidney Exchange have successfully been using this theory by implementing different programs based on this. By using different examples and simulations it is showed that these algorithms can optimize and be used in real world examples, such organ donation, house market allocation, allocating students to universities etc. It’s also shown that by looking into the different properties, especially fairness, which can be measured on different terms, such as procedural versus outcome fairness, and efficiency that it often come down to a choice between these properties. And that it’s a mixture regarding what the agents prefer, variables such as age and geography also seems to have an impact especially in organ donation. Lastly I am introducing Liver Exchange, which are being implemented based on the success of Kidney Exchange. I’m introducing the theory behind and how it differs from Kidney exchange.
|Educations||MSc in Business Administration and Mathematical Business Economics, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis|
|Number of pages||85|