Beskatning af ulovlige aktionærlån: efter indførslen af LL § 16 E

Abstract

This thesis topic is taxation of (il)legal shareholder loans, after the implementation of LL § 16 E In connection with the provision arises a number of issues in relation to identifying the applicable law. Next, it is interesting to look at why the (il)legal shareholder loans still exist, despite the prohibition in the Company Act SL § 210 and the taxation in the Tax Assessment Act (LL) § 16 E. This thesis legal section analyzes existing law with respect to taxation of (il)legal shareholder loans LL § 16 E, aiming at reducing the incentives to acquire the loans in the company. But since it is a complex and far-reaching legislation, there have been some doubts as to what and who is covered. Danish Accountants have made an empirical study of the number of illegal loans, this analysis shows that in the year 2013 illegal shareholder loans still exist. The empirical study also shows that there are still coming new loans, 3,033 new loans have been recorded from 2012 to 2013. The fact that the loans still exist despite taxation and prohibition, makes it interesting to look at why this is the case. For that purpose is the economic theories used, behavioral theory and the principal- agent theory. The analysis is based on the theory assumptions for analyzing the reason behind behavior. The analysis describes among other things, the impact of bounded rationality and how positive and negative incentives can be used. The analysis of the law and of behavior lead to an analysis of how economic theories can explain why LL § 16 E is being violated. One explanation may be that the government has chosen, with effect from the year 2013 to reduce requirements for auditing requirements from companies in accounting class B. This exemption means that it is possible for shareholders to hide their (il)legal behavior in relation to the inclusion of (il)legal shareholder loans.