This paper seeks to investigate the changes to the auditor independent report as proposed by the IAASB. The paper sets out to describe the proposed changes and evaluate the value of these with reference to possible users of the financial statements. As a final point we look into whether considering the auditor to be serving the public interest is a fair assumption at a theoretical level and how it applies specifically to the proposed changes to the auditor’s report as proposed by IAASB. The proposed changes primarily introduces the concept of ‘Key Audit Matters’ which is a new section under which the auditor shall describe matters that have been of great significance to the audit and about which the auditor has communicated with those charged with governance. Other than this the changes propose a new structure to the auditor’s report that puts more focus on the auditor’s opinion as well matters significant to the audit. Among these is the assumption of ‘going concern’ which is proposed to have an explicit section in the auditor’s report whereas it did not before, unless the auditor issued a qualified opinion. The changes to the auditor’s report do contain some conceptually valuable ideas. However, these changes are highly contingent on how it will be implemented if it should create any substantial value to the users of financial statements. This implementation is dependent on the auditor and to what degree the auditor is actually found to serve the public interest. This paper finds that the auditor on a theoretical level has incentives that skew the auditors work away from that of the public interest and the analysis of both the proposed changes and the current literature on the subject of auditing seems to confirm this initial theoretical analysis. Lastly we recommend some issues for further studies and encourage the use of a theoretical model with symmetrical assumptions about all actors. This leads us to recommend a model which is developed in the theoretical section, where the auditor is assumed to act in one’s own self-interest as well as is usually assumed to be the case of management and owner in the classical principal-agent-model.
|Educations||MSc in Auditing, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis|
|Number of pages||120|