In my dissertation, I wanted to explore the possibility of introducing a general consumer protection rule set for cases where consumers suffer loss by a trader´s bankruptcy. The scheme would cover all retail outlets, therefore it was important to clarify whether it would be necessary for an organization or whether the current rules already give consumers the protection they need. It has also been central to study whether the cost of administering the scheme would be offset by the benefit that consumers would experience from bankruptcy insurance. Additionally I have reviewed how a system could best be organized and how such a system would affect society. I have been focusing on insurance theory with asymmetric information that allows adverse selection and moral hazard. It is important that the system gives incentives to both traders and consumers to avoid abuse of the system. Incentives created through inspection and fines to the stores, and through control and excesses to consumers as they would pay a portion of their losses themselves. It was also important that consumers experienced utility would increase by the introduction of a system, so that the cost of the scheme were outweighed by the security consumers would get. I came to the conclusion that even though there is already legislation and opportunities for both consumers and traders for better protection, they are largely illusory. Consumers do not have a sufficiently strong bargaining power to obtain protection for themselves, and the stores do not have strong enough incentives to implement better protection. Therefore I have investigated how a system could be organized by the legislatures. I came to the conclusion that a collective savings system, where consumers pay for instance 1 per thousand (0.1%) above the product´s price witch traders withhold and pay into the system, the same way they pay VAT and tax, would be the best solution. In order for consumer benefits to outweigh the administrative costs associated with the system, there would have to be a lower amount limit for witch requirements should be cut off at e.g. 500 or 800kr. It would depend on the individual product elasticity whether consumers or traders would bear the largest share of the cost of the scheme. The scheme would not distort relative prices and although there would be a dead weight loss associated with the system, it would be offset by increased consumer benefits by getting a better security.
|Educations||MSc in Commercial Law, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis|
|Number of pages||136|