This master thesis is about employer liability with a special focus on reducing the risk of do-ing business. Additionally the thesis will examine how the law affects the overall welfare re-garding this issue. In Denmark employer liability is regulated in Danske Lov from 1683 and in a lot of tort case law. This issue is relevant for a lot of Danes who go to work every day without fully understanding the economic risks they are taking. This is also relevant for businesses without the right measures to minimize their risk. This includes cases of damaged property, injured people or significant miscalculations in the daily work. The first chapter is a theory section including all the relevant background knowledge like problem formulation, methods, point of view etc., which you need in order to fully understand the paper. Then follows a legal chapter examining the boundaries of existing law and how employers can reduce their risk of doing business in connection to employer liability. This includes insurance, corporate structures and independently acting third parties. There will also be an analysis on culpa - the Danish rule to determine responsibility. In the economic chapter the thesis examines the incentives and economic consequences creat-ed by the law in the context of employer liability. Do the employees have the right incentives to be alert? How do you create the right incentives? This is investigated by analyzing the mo-tivations from a behavioral economic point of view. This will be done more specifically by comparing the different legal conditions. The integrated chapter assesses the results and presents advice to the legislatures on how the law can be optimized. Shall the government interfere less and have the parties make their own agreements regarding employer liability? Or can the government change the current set of rules and thereby increase the overall wealth? The main conclusion in this thesis is, that the current set of rules in Danish law gives an ex-cellent starting point regarding the regulation of employer liability. This is because the law places most of the risk with the employer which is optimal. In combination with this the em-ployee incentives are optimized by the employer by screenings, monitoring and the possibility of promotions etc. This maximize the overall wealth.
|Educations||MSc in Commercial Law, (Graduate Programme) Final Thesis|
|Number of pages||83|