Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa

Louise Thorn Bøttkjær, Mogens Kamp Justesen

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Democratic elections are supposed to prevent corrupt politicians from winning office. In practice, however, voters frequently vote for corrupt politicians. In this paper, we examine why voters sometimes support corrupt candidates. We interrogate this seeming paradox from the perspective of explanations highlighting that voters support corrupt candidates because of lack of information; because of clientelist exchanges of material benefits in return for votes; or because of party loyalty. We test these explanations through an embedded experiment in a new nationwide survey in South Africa – a country where issues of corruption are highly salient. We find that voters express strong willingness to punish corrupt candidates across all treatment conditions. However, voters are more lenient towards corrupt politicians when they are offered material benefits in return for their vote as part of a clientelist exchange. This suggests that clientelism serves to reproduce corruption, and have important implications for the fight against corruption.
Original languageEnglish
Publication date2018
Number of pages35
Publication statusPublished - 2018
EventThe 8th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association - Schloss Schönbrunn, Vienna, Austria
Duration: 21 Jun 201823 Jun 2018
Conference number: 8
http://www.epsanet.org/conference-2018/

Conference

ConferenceThe 8th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association
Number8
LocationSchloss Schönbrunn
CountryAustria
CityVienna
Period21/06/201823/06/2018
Internet address

Bibliographical note

CBS Library does not have access to the material

Cite this

Bøttkjær, L. T., & Justesen, M. K. (2018). Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa. Paper presented at The 8th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, Vienna, Austria.
Bøttkjær, Louise Thorn ; Justesen, Mogens Kamp. / Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa. Paper presented at The 8th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, Vienna, Austria.35 p.
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Bøttkjær, LT & Justesen, MK 2018, 'Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa' Paper presented at, Vienna, Austria, 21/06/2018 - 23/06/2018, .

Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa. / Bøttkjær, Louise Thorn ; Justesen, Mogens Kamp.

2018. Paper presented at The 8th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, Vienna, Austria.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

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AU - Justesen, Mogens Kamp

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N2 - Democratic elections are supposed to prevent corrupt politicians from winning office. In practice, however, voters frequently vote for corrupt politicians. In this paper, we examine why voters sometimes support corrupt candidates. We interrogate this seeming paradox from the perspective of explanations highlighting that voters support corrupt candidates because of lack of information; because of clientelist exchanges of material benefits in return for votes; or because of party loyalty. We test these explanations through an embedded experiment in a new nationwide survey in South Africa – a country where issues of corruption are highly salient. We find that voters express strong willingness to punish corrupt candidates across all treatment conditions. However, voters are more lenient towards corrupt politicians when they are offered material benefits in return for their vote as part of a clientelist exchange. This suggests that clientelism serves to reproduce corruption, and have important implications for the fight against corruption.

AB - Democratic elections are supposed to prevent corrupt politicians from winning office. In practice, however, voters frequently vote for corrupt politicians. In this paper, we examine why voters sometimes support corrupt candidates. We interrogate this seeming paradox from the perspective of explanations highlighting that voters support corrupt candidates because of lack of information; because of clientelist exchanges of material benefits in return for votes; or because of party loyalty. We test these explanations through an embedded experiment in a new nationwide survey in South Africa – a country where issues of corruption are highly salient. We find that voters express strong willingness to punish corrupt candidates across all treatment conditions. However, voters are more lenient towards corrupt politicians when they are offered material benefits in return for their vote as part of a clientelist exchange. This suggests that clientelism serves to reproduce corruption, and have important implications for the fight against corruption.

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Bøttkjær LT, Justesen MK. Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from South Africa. 2018. Paper presented at The 8th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, Vienna, Austria.