Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings?

Susan E. K. Christoffersen, Erfan Danesh, David K. Musto

Research output: Working paperResearch

Abstract

Institutional investors are allowed to delay their disclosures of quarter-end holdings via form 13F for up to 45 days. This forbearance may help protect the institutions from potentially damaging behavior by other traders, in particular from free-riding copycatters and from front-runners. It also may help the institutions hide their voting power, and this has prompted public corporations to request a much shorter maximum reporting lag. We look at 14 years of 13F filings to gauge the role of these three motives in the decision to delay disclosure, and the results indicate that front-running and voting, but not copycatting, motivate delays.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationToronto
PublisherRotman School of Management, University of Toronto
Number of pages57
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017
SeriesRotman School of Management Working Paper
Number2661535

Keywords

  • SEC
  • Reporting requirements
  • 13F Filings

Cite this

Christoffersen, S. E. K., Danesh, E., & Musto, D. K. (2017). Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings? Toronto: Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. Rotman School of Management Working Paper, No. 2661535 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2661535
Christoffersen, Susan E. K. ; Danesh, Erfan ; Musto, David K. / Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings?. Toronto : Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 2017. (Rotman School of Management Working Paper; No. 2661535).
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Christoffersen, SEK, Danesh, E & Musto, DK 2017 'Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings?' Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2661535

Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings? / Christoffersen, Susan E. K.; Danesh, Erfan; Musto, David K.

Toronto : Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 2017.

Research output: Working paperResearch

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Christoffersen SEK, Danesh E, Musto DK. Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings? Toronto: Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. 2017. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2661535