When Do Employees Choose to Be Represented on the Board of Directors? Empirical Analysis of Board-level Employee Representation in Denmark

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Abstract

Drawing on transaction costs economics and longitudinal data on Danish corporations, we analyse the distribution of board-level employee representation (BLER) and the characteristics of employee directors in a context where workers have the possibility (but not also an obligation) to nominate representatives to the board of directors. We show that BLER is less likely instituted in firms with CEO or family-related members on the board, but more likely observed in larger, older firms and in those with high firm-specific human capital and union density. Firm-specific human capital, qualifications and union membership also determine individual worker's probability to become a board member.

Original languageEnglish
JournalBritish Journal of Industrial Relations
Volume58
Issue number2
Pages (from-to)241-272
Number of pages32
ISSN0007-1080
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2020

Bibliographical note

Published online: 20 August 2019.

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