Abstract
In Anti-Individualism and Knowledge Jessica Brown criticises views of content that combine Fregean Sense and anti-individualism. Brown assumes that all Fregean theories are motivated by a picture of the rational thinker as someone who will always have transparent access to the simple inferential consequences of his thoughts. This picture, Brown argues, is incompatible with anti-individualism about content. While traditional Fregean theories have indeed had such motivation, Brown’s mistake is in attributing this motivation to the modern Fregean anti-individualist. My goal in this paper is to bring to light a different, and seldom discussed, motivation for Fregean views of content which is immune to Browns objections.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Grazer Philosophische Studien |
Volume | 94 |
Issue number | 1-2 |
Pages (from-to) | 153-172 |
Number of pages | 20 |
ISSN | 0165-9227 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Anti-individualism
- Fregean content
- Truth
- Demonstrative thought
- Externalism