Abstract
Throughout the centuries philosophers have made statements that do not seem to make any sense, at least not according to the established language that we use. Examples include Spinoza’s idea that a belief in miracles ‘would lead to atheism’ (2002: 448), Bergson’s insistence that we laugh at a ‘particular mechanical arrangement’ (1911: 86), and Heidegger’s claim that ‘we are not yet capable of thinking’ (1993: 369). Or take the following (rather confusing) sentence by Deleuze: ‘a clear idea is in itself confused; it is confused in so far as it is clear’ (1994: 213). Some philosophers have even maintained that they are not philosophers at all (e.g. Arendt, Foucault), which doesn’t seem to make much sense either. Why is it that philosophers make these kinds of paradoxical statements? Are these merely unrepresentative examples? Do we need sociological, psychological, or even psychopathological theories in order to explain them? Or has this apparent nonsense something to do with the ‘essence’ of philosophy itself?
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Philosophy and Organization |
Editors | Campbell Jones, René ten Bos |
Number of pages | 13 |
Place of Publication | Abingdon |
Publisher | Routledge |
Publication date | 12 Apr 2007 |
Pages | 55-67 |
Chapter | 3 |
ISBN (Print) | 0415371171, 041537118X , 9780415371179 , 9780415371186 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780203030851, 0203030850 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 12 Apr 2007 |
Externally published | Yes |