Welfare Chauvinism in Times of Labour Market Segmentation: How Different Employment Contracts Moderate the Impact of Welfare Chauvinism on support for Radical Right Parties

I examine how diferent employment contracts moderate the impact of welfare chauvinist preferences on radical right support. Welfare chauvinism has become a cornerstone of radical right’s nativist electoral programme. Yet, there are mixed fndings on how welfare chauvinist preferences afect radical right support. While some studies fnd a positive association, others fnd little correlation. One reason for such ambiguity is: voters who support welfare chauvinism may prioritise other competing issue preferences. They may thus vote for other parties, even if such parties do not ofer welfare chauvinist programmes. From this perspective, the crucial question is: under what conditions do voters who support welfare chauvinism prefer the radical right? Among other reasons, I argue that they may do so when they experience economic risk from insecure employment contracts. Diferences in employment protection legislation strictness for diferent employment contracts yield diferences in employment security for these diferent contracts. Using cross-national data from the European Social Survey (Rounds 1 and 7), I fnd that employed workers, who support welfare chauvinism and have temporary contracts, vote most for radical right parties. I regard this fnding as evidence that voters supporting welfare chauvinism prefer radical right parties under conditions of employment insecurity.