Abstract
Key Takeaways
- This paper examines why family firms often perform worse after a CEO succession, despite seemingly high alignment of incentives.
- The authors show nearly half of all family successors have never held a full-time job outside the family firm.
- These internally groomed successors drive no measurable improvements in firm performance after succession.
- By contrast, family successors with outside labor market experience perform similarly to unrelated, professional CEOs.
- The findings point to a critical mechanism: outside experience helps successors build leadership capital they cannot develop within the family firm alone.
- This paper examines why family firms often perform worse after a CEO succession, despite seemingly high alignment of incentives.
- The authors show nearly half of all family successors have never held a full-time job outside the family firm.
- These internally groomed successors drive no measurable improvements in firm performance after succession.
- By contrast, family successors with outside labor market experience perform similarly to unrelated, professional CEOs.
- The findings point to a critical mechanism: outside experience helps successors build leadership capital they cannot develop within the family firm alone.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publication date | 28 May 2025 |
| Place of Publication | WWW |
| Publisher | HKU Business School |
| Publication status | Published - 28 May 2025 |
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