Tycoon Candidates, Electoral Strategies, and Voter Support: A Survey Experiment in South Africa

Mogens Kamp Justesen*, Stanislav Markus

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

Why do voters shun some business tycoons yet elect others into power? As structural conditions facilitate the entry of super-wealthy actors into politics, the differential electoral support across business elites suggests a puzzle. We conceptualize four mechanisms behind the popular support for “tycoon candidates”: competence signaling, framing, fame, and clientelism. To test their relative efficacy, we leverage an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in South Africa, an important developing democracy where certain tycoons are successfully running for office. We find that, across distinct electoral appeals by tycoon candidates, clientelism is particularly effective, especially for mobilizing support from the less affluent voters. Racial framing significantly decreases support among white voters. Meanwhile, tycoons’ competence signaling or fame do not help them at the ballot box. By identifying the micro-level underpinnings of voter support across tycoon candidates, our study contributes to the literatures on business and politics, voting behavior, and clientelism.
Original languageEnglish
JournalBusiness and Politics
Number of pages19
ISSN1369-5258
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 18 Mar 2024

Bibliographical note

Epub ahead of print. Published online: 18 March 2024.

Keywords

  • Business tycoons
  • Corporate political strategy
  • Business and politics
  • South Africa
  • Clientelism

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