Transnational Veto Players and the Practice of Financial Reform

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

    Abstract

    Policy processes in transnational settings are shaped by actors whose approval and consent are required for reform to take place. These ‘transnational veto players’ frame and delimit policy options. The concept of ‘transnational veto players’ is developed through an empirical analysis of global reforms in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions deemed ‘too big to fail’. Actors debating and developing policy on ‘too big to fail’ may have formal defined constituencies, as regulators, academics or lobbying organisations, but in their transnational interactions they are also informed by a diffuse constituency of peers through their multiple associations within policy communities. These interactions determine which policy ideas are permissible and how they are adopted. The ‘too big to fail’ case shows how reform activity to curtail the risks posed by large financial institutions may also inadvertently strengthen their position as transnational veto players.
    Policy processes in transnational settings are shaped by actors whose approval and consent are required for reform to take place. These ‘transnational veto players’ frame and delimit policy options. The concept of ‘transnational veto players’ is developed through an empirical analysis of global reforms in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions deemed ‘too big to fail’. Actors debating and developing policy on ‘too big to fail’ may have formal defined constituencies, as regulators, academics or lobbying organisations, but in their transnational interactions they are also informed by a diffuse constituency of peers through their multiple associations within policy communities. These interactions determine which policy ideas are permissible and how they are adopted. The ‘too big to fail’ case shows how reform activity to curtail the risks posed by large financial institutions may also inadvertently strengthen their position as transnational veto players.
    LanguageEnglish
    Date7 May 2013
    Number of pages22
    StatePublished - 7 May 2013
    EventInternational and European Economic Governance - Frederiksberg, Denmark
    Duration: 7 May 20137 May 2013

    Workshop

    WorkshopInternational and European Economic Governance
    CountryDenmark
    CityFrederiksberg
    Period07/05/201307/05/2013

    Cite this

    Tsingou, E. (2013). Transnational Veto Players and the Practice of Financial Reform. Paper presented at International and European Economic Governance, Frederiksberg, Denmark.
    Tsingou, Eleni. / Transnational Veto Players and the Practice of Financial Reform. Paper presented at International and European Economic Governance, Frederiksberg, Denmark.22 p.
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    Tsingou, E 2013, 'Transnational Veto Players and the Practice of Financial Reform' Paper presented at, Frederiksberg, Denmark, 07/05/2013 - 07/05/2013, .

    Transnational Veto Players and the Practice of Financial Reform. / Tsingou, Eleni.

    2013. Paper presented at International and European Economic Governance, Frederiksberg, Denmark.

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

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    Tsingou E. Transnational Veto Players and the Practice of Financial Reform. 2013. Paper presented at International and European Economic Governance, Frederiksberg, Denmark.