Toxic Ties: Corporate Networks of Market Control in the European Chemical Industry, 1960–2000

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This paper contributes to filling a gap in existing network scholarship by bringing into focus how companies utilize corporate networks of market control when confronted with uncertainties in their political-economic environment. Outlining a network theory of market control and taking the European chemical industry as its case, the paper utilizes original data to track board interlocks, cartel ties and mergers among the 24 largest chemical companies from 1960 to 2000. While a densely connected industry that was remarkably stable in its composition is observed, it is also concluded that the type(s) of market control measures companies engaged in evolved dynamically in response to political-economic conditions. The chemical companies reacted to the crisis of the 1970s by forming cartels; when cartels became less attractive due to regulatory developments, companies increasingly turned to the formation of transnational board interlocks to cope with intensified competition in the 1980s and 1990s; and when this form of market control proved insufficient, a number of the companies merged with one another. While the paper concludes that the sequencing of interlocks and cartels is mainly driven by exogenous pressures, it finds no evidence to support that board interlocks constitute sites of cartel formation.
This paper contributes to filling a gap in existing network scholarship by bringing into focus how companies utilize corporate networks of market control when confronted with uncertainties in their political-economic environment. Outlining a network theory of market control and taking the European chemical industry as its case, the paper utilizes original data to track board interlocks, cartel ties and mergers among the 24 largest chemical companies from 1960 to 2000. While a densely connected industry that was remarkably stable in its composition is observed, it is also concluded that the type(s) of market control measures companies engaged in evolved dynamically in response to political-economic conditions. The chemical companies reacted to the crisis of the 1970s by forming cartels; when cartels became less attractive due to regulatory developments, companies increasingly turned to the formation of transnational board interlocks to cope with intensified competition in the 1980s and 1990s; and when this form of market control proved insufficient, a number of the companies merged with one another. While the paper concludes that the sequencing of interlocks and cartels is mainly driven by exogenous pressures, it finds no evidence to support that board interlocks constitute sites of cartel formation.
LanguageEnglish
JournalSocial Networks
Volume58
Pages24-36
Number of pages13
ISSN0378-8733
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2019

Keywords

  • Corporate networks
  • Market control
  • Cartels
  • Interlocking directorates
  • Dynamic network analysis

Cite this

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abstract = "This paper contributes to filling a gap in existing network scholarship by bringing into focus how companies utilize corporate networks of market control when confronted with uncertainties in their political-economic environment. Outlining a network theory of market control and taking the European chemical industry as its case, the paper utilizes original data to track board interlocks, cartel ties and mergers among the 24 largest chemical companies from 1960 to 2000. While a densely connected industry that was remarkably stable in its composition is observed, it is also concluded that the type(s) of market control measures companies engaged in evolved dynamically in response to political-economic conditions. The chemical companies reacted to the crisis of the 1970s by forming cartels; when cartels became less attractive due to regulatory developments, companies increasingly turned to the formation of transnational board interlocks to cope with intensified competition in the 1980s and 1990s; and when this form of market control proved insufficient, a number of the companies merged with one another. While the paper concludes that the sequencing of interlocks and cartels is mainly driven by exogenous pressures, it finds no evidence to support that board interlocks constitute sites of cartel formation.",
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Toxic Ties : Corporate Networks of Market Control in the European Chemical Industry, 1960–2000. / Buch-Hansen, Hubert; Henriksen, Lasse Folke .

In: Social Networks, Vol. 58, 07.2019, p. 24-36.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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