Towards a Framework of Digital Platform Competition: A Comparative Study of Monopolistic & Federated Mobile Payment Platforms

Erol Kazan, Chee-Wee Tan, Eric T. K. Lim

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    This paper advances a framework for examining the competitive principles of mobile payment platforms. We postulate that the strategic interplay of platform layers will drive the competitive dynamics of platform-driven ubiquitous systems. This framework has been employed in a comparative case study between monopolistic (i.e., Pingit) and federated (i.e., Paym) mobile payment platforms to illustrate its applicability and yield principles on the nature and impact of competition among platform-driven ubiquitous systems. Preliminary findings indicate that monopolistic mobile digital platforms attempt to create unique configurals to obtain monopolistic power by tightly coupling platform layers, which are difficult to replicate. Conversely, federated digital platforms compete by dispersing the service layer to harness the collective resources from individual firms. Furthermore, the interaction and integration among platform layers give rise to commodity and value platform layers that translate into competitive battlegrounds among mobile payment services. This paper therefore represents a concrete step in unraveling the competitive dynamics of platform-driven ubiquitous systems from an architectural viewpoint.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalJournal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research
    Issue number3
    Pages (from-to)50-64
    Number of pages15
    Publication statusPublished - 2016


    • Digital platforms
    • Layered modular architecture
    • Mobile payment
    • Centralized and distributed governance
    • Ubiquitous systems
    • UK payment industry

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