The Power of Non-Controlling Stake

Below Parity Representation of Employees on Corporate Boards

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We discuss the potential for below-parity employee representation in the board of directors by analyzing the workers’ choice to adopt this mechanism of employee voice when employee board representation is optional and employees are granted only a minor share of board seats. Combining the stakeholder and institutional theory we reason that, under shareholder supremacy, the effectiveness of this mechanism and, consequently, the utility that the employees gain from board representation will be higher when workers hold firm-specific human capital, and in the presence of institutions that legitimize employees’ voice and consequently corroborate their influence on board. We conjecture how these factors vary with region, firm and worker characteristics. We test our propositions using the Danish employer-employee linked data for public and private firms.
Original languageEnglish
Publication dateJun 2017
Number of pages46
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2017
EventThe 3rd Annual ICGS Conference: Balancing Value Creation with Stakeholder Accountability - Luiss University, Rome, Italy
Duration: 2 Sep 20173 Sep 2017
Conference number: 3
https://icgsociety.org/conferences/past-conferences/

Conference

ConferenceThe 3rd Annual ICGS Conference
Number3
LocationLuiss University
CountryItaly
CityRome
Period02/09/201703/09/2017
Internet address

Keywords

  • Boards
  • Voice
  • Employee representation
  • Codetermination
  • Family firms

Cite this

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The Power of Non-Controlling Stake : Below Parity Representation of Employees on Corporate Boards. / Gregoric, Aleksandra; Poulsen, Thomas.

2017. Paper presented at The 3rd Annual ICGS Conference, Rome, Italy.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

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KW - Codetermination

KW - Family firms

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KW - Voice

KW - Employee representation

KW - Codetermination

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