The Paradoxes of Liberalism: Can the International Financial Architecture be Disciplined?

Grahame Thompson

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    Abstract

    Jakob Vestergaard has produced one of the most telling analyses of the international financial architecture by deploying a broadly Foucauldian framework that invokes a novel description of neo-liberal governance, one organized around discipline, conditional exceptions and the pursuit of a ‘proper economy’. This review both welcomes but challenges some of Vestergaard's analysis. In so doing it explores further the paradoxes of liberalism and the fate of sovereignty in the current international context.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalEconomy and Society
    Volume40
    Issue number3
    Pages (from-to)477-487
    ISSN0308-5147
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2011

    Keywords

    • Liberalism
    • Foucault
    • International Financial Architecture
    • Washington Consensus
    • Proper Economy
    • Economic Governance

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