The Motivating Role of Truth in Reasoning: A Defence of Object-dependent Fregean Senses

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Intuitively, when all goes well, we adopt beliefs based on inference because we realize that their truth is established by the truth of the involved premises. If this intuitive picture of our successful reasoning is correct, then it must be possible that our reasoning is motivated by our sensitivity to the soundness of the involved inference. This paper argues that such a view of ideal reasoning can only be upheld if we accept the minority view that the proper inferential role of our thoughts is individuated in terms of object dependent Fregean senses. I consider respectively Millian, Guise–Fregean, and object dependent Fregean views, and show how only the latter view provides a picture of our theoretical reasoning where sensitivity to soundness can be what motivates a subject’s reasoning.
Original languageEnglish
JournalErkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy
Number of pages14
Publication statusPublished - 28 Oct 2020

Bibliographical note

Epub ahead of print. Published online: 28 October 2020.

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