The Market for CEOs: An Empirical Analysis

Varouj A. Aivazian, Tat-kei Lai, Mohammad M. Rahaman

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate empirically a market-based explanation for the rise in recent years in external CEO hiring and compensation and find, consistent with the market-based theory, that firms in industries relying on general managerial skills are more likely to hire CEOs externally than firms in industries relying less on such skills. We show that firms relying on internal CEOs have on average higher profits than external-CEO firms and that the difference in profits decreases as general skills become more important in the industry. We relate managerial skills to compensation and show that CEO general skills induce better firm performance and higher compensation.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Economics and Business
Volume67
Issue numberMay-June
Pages (from-to)24-54
ISSN0148-6195
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Cite this

Aivazian, Varouj A. ; Lai, Tat-kei ; Rahaman, Mohammad M. / The Market for CEOs : An Empirical Analysis. In: Journal of Economics and Business. 2013 ; Vol. 67, No. May-June. pp. 24-54.
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Aivazian, VA, Lai, T & Rahaman, MM 2013, 'The Market for CEOs: An Empirical Analysis', Journal of Economics and Business, vol. 67, no. May-June, pp. 24-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2013.02.001

The Market for CEOs : An Empirical Analysis. / Aivazian, Varouj A.; Lai, Tat-kei; Rahaman, Mohammad M.

In: Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 67, No. May-June, 2013, p. 24-54.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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KW - CEO compensation

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