We study turnover among executives and directors in companies owned by Danish industrial foundations, which are held to be long term owners. Executives are members of the management board (direktionen), whereas directors a members of the supervisiory board (bestyrelsen). As expected, we find that both director and executive turnover is lower in foundation-owned companies. Foundation-owned companies are more likely to replace directors, but not executives, when performance is bad (negative profits). Thus, we find some evidence of long-termism in foundation-owned companies.
|Place of Publication||Frederiksberg|
|Publisher||Center for Corporate Governance. Department of International Economics and Management. Copenhagen Business School|
|Number of pages||17|
|Publication status||Published - 2 Jun 2014|
Bibliographical notePrevious version of this paper was presented at a seminar held by Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 1. December 2013
Børsting, C., Kuhn, J., Poulsen, T., & Thomsen, S. (2014). The Governance of Industrial Foundations: Executive and Director Turnover. Frederiksberg: Center for Corporate Governance. Department of International Economics and Management. Copenhagen Business School.