How does population dynamics influence outcomes in situations with public good characteristics? The present paper answers this question by analysing the evolution of costly cooperation in a multi-group population. Building on insights first developed in modern biology the idea of viscous population equilibria is introduced (a population is said to be viscous when a (sub)population of players is spatially or genetically clustered). A simple model then analyses how the combined effect of viscosity within multiple subgroups and different levels of between-group segregation influences the evolution of cooperation. The results suggest that a key issue in the evolution of cooperation is the shifting balance between the need to protect cooperators and propagation of the tendency to cooperate.
| Original language | English |
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| Place of Publication | Frederiksberg |
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| Publisher | The Link Program |
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| Number of pages | 30 |
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| Publication status | Published - 2001 |
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| Externally published | Yes |
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| Series | LINK Working Paper |
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| Number | 2001-26 |
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