Abstract
We consider a game in which a large number of identical agents choose when to queue up at a single server after it opens. Agents are impatient for service and also incur a cost proportional to time spent in the queue. We show that the first-in–first-out queue discipline and the last-in–first-out queue discipline both lead to a unique equilibrium arrival distribution. However, among all work-conserving queue disciplines, the first-in–first-out performs the worst in terms of equilibrium utility and welfare, while the last-in–first-out performs the best.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 104 |
Pages (from-to) | 165–176 |
Number of pages | 12 |
ISSN | 0899-8256 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2017 |
Keywords
- Queue discipline
- Nash equilibrium
- FIFO
- LIFO
- Welfare
- Congestion