Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda

Konrad B. Burchardi, Jonathan de Quidt*, Selim Gulesci, Benedetta Lerva, Stefano Tripodi

*Corresponding author for this work

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Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in the mechanism, which are well-known problems with the BDM. We highlight three such features and test them in the field in rural Uganda, a relevant population for many recent applications. Comprehension is very high, and 86 percent of participants bid optimally for an induced-value voucher, with little variation across treatments. This gives confidence for similar applications, and suggests the comprehension-expediency trade-off is mild.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102701
JournalJournal of Development Economics
Number of pages8
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2021


  • Willingness to pay
  • Becker–DeGroot–Marschak
  • Field experiment

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