Tech War or Phony War?: America’s Porous Controls on Semiconductor Fabrication Equipment and China’s Response

Douglas B. Fuller

Tech War or Phony War? America’s Porous Controls on Semiconductor Fabrication Equipment and China’s Response

Department of International Economics, Government and Business

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research

Abstract

This article assesses the effectiveness of the Biden administration’s export
controls on semiconductor fabrication (chipmaking) equipment targeting
China and China’s response. America’s licensing for chipmaking equipment
has been surprisingly loose since Biden expanded the range of controls in
October 2022. Thus, while China has not made much headway in replacing
critical American, Dutch, and Japanese equipment, the setbacks to China’s
advanced chipmaking have been less than originally anticipated. SMIC’s
ability to make chips for Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro is a direct result of loose
licensing. The recent revisions of American controls in October 2023, and the
Dutch and Japanese controls also announced in 2023, may make it
substantially more difficult for China to advance, particularly by limiting
lithography sales, but ultimately the future efficacy of these technology
controls depends on changing American licensing practices as well as on
revising the rules behind them.

Original language	English
Journal	China Leadership Monitor
Issue number	78
Number of pages	14
ISSN	1542-4197
Publication status	Published - Dec 2023

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title = "Tech War or Phony War?: America{\textquoteright}s Porous Controls on Semiconductor Fabrication Equipment and China{\textquoteright}s Response",

abstract = "This article assesses the effectiveness of the Biden administration{\textquoteright}s export controls on semiconductor fabrication (chipmaking) equipment targeting China and China{\textquoteright}s response. America{\textquoteright}s licensing for chipmaking equipment has been surprisingly loose since Biden expanded the range of controls in October 2022. Thus, while China has not made much headway in replacing critical American, Dutch, and Japanese equipment, the setbacks to China{\textquoteright}s advanced chipmaking have been less than originally anticipated. SMIC{\textquoteright}s ability to make chips for Huawei{\textquoteright}s Mate 60 Pro is a direct result of loose licensing. The recent revisions of American controls in October 2023, and the Dutch and Japanese controls also announced in 2023, may make it substantially more difficult for China to advance, particularly by limiting lithography sales, but ultimately the future efficacy of these technology controls depends on changing American licensing practices as well as on revising the rules behind them.",

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N2 - This article assesses the effectiveness of the Biden administration’s export controls on semiconductor fabrication (chipmaking) equipment targeting China and China’s response. America’s licensing for chipmaking equipment has been surprisingly loose since Biden expanded the range of controls in October 2022. Thus, while China has not made much headway in replacing critical American, Dutch, and Japanese equipment, the setbacks to China’s advanced chipmaking have been less than originally anticipated. SMIC’s ability to make chips for Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro is a direct result of loose licensing. The recent revisions of American controls in October 2023, and the Dutch and Japanese controls also announced in 2023, may make it substantially more difficult for China to advance, particularly by limiting lithography sales, but ultimately the future efficacy of these technology controls depends on changing American licensing practices as well as on revising the rules behind them.

AB - This article assesses the effectiveness of the Biden administration’s export controls on semiconductor fabrication (chipmaking) equipment targeting China and China’s response. America’s licensing for chipmaking equipment has been surprisingly loose since Biden expanded the range of controls in October 2022. Thus, while China has not made much headway in replacing critical American, Dutch, and Japanese equipment, the setbacks to China’s advanced chipmaking have been less than originally anticipated. SMIC’s ability to make chips for Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro is a direct result of loose licensing. The recent revisions of American controls in October 2023, and the Dutch and Japanese controls also announced in 2023, may make it substantially more difficult for China to advance, particularly by limiting lithography sales, but ultimately the future efficacy of these technology controls depends on changing American licensing practices as well as on revising the rules behind them.

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