Taxes and Venture Capital Support

Christian Keuschnigg, Søren Bo Nielsen

Research output: Working paperResearch

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Abstract

In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard.Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas.Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effortput forth by either agent contributes to the firm's success, but is not verifiable. Asa result, the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capitalsupport. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairsadvice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place,limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venturecapital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed startupsare detrimental in our framework.Keywords: Venture capital, capital gains taxation, double moral hazard.JEL-Classification: D82, G24, H24, H25
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationKøbenhavn
Number of pages34
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Cite this

Keuschnigg, C., & Nielsen, S. B. (2003). Taxes and Venture Capital Support.