Superstar Directors

Marc Steffen Rapp, Thomas Schmid, Daniel Urband

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

    Abstract

    We examine directors that serve on boards of multiple firms and argue that the distance between corporate headquarters can help to identify “superstar directors”. Based on a novel board dataset covering 35,000 firms across 54 countries, we identify plausibly exogenous retirements of busy directors to show that those serving for distant firms increase firm value. Part of the effect can be explained by superior director-firm matching. We further show that superstar directors improve monitoring, but are not necessarily better advisors.
    Original languageEnglish
    Publication date2017
    Number of pages57
    Publication statusPublished - 2017
    Event2017 Financial Management Association European Conference - Lisbon School of Economics & Management (ISEG), Universidade de Lisbo, Lissabon, Portugal
    Duration: 22 Jun 201723 Jun 2017
    http://www.fmaconferences.org/Lisbon/LisbonProgram.htm

    Conference

    Conference2017 Financial Management Association European Conference
    LocationLisbon School of Economics & Management (ISEG), Universidade de Lisbo
    CountryPortugal
    CityLissabon
    Period22/06/201723/06/2017
    Internet address

    Keywords

    • Corporate governance
    • Boards
    • Busyness
    • Firm value

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