Strategic Non-disclosure in Patents

Alexandra Zaby, Diana Heger, Marek Giebel

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Patent law requires the full, clear, and concise disclosure of an invention in exchange for the protection of the intellectual property. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the strategic motives to limit knowledge disclosure in patents and how this affects follow-on innovation. Using USPTO patent examination data we use Office actions associated with insufficient disclosure to investigate whether and how the modification of a patent specification in the course of examination impacts follow-on innovation. We find that inventors Ægame the systemÆ using strategic non-disclosure as a means to reduce follow-on innovation.
Original languageEnglish
Publication date2022
Number of pages25
Publication statusPublished - 2022
EventDRUID22 Conference - Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark
Duration: 13 Jun 202215 Jun 2022
Conference number: 43
https://conference.druid.dk/Druid/index.xhtml?confId=64

Conference

ConferenceDRUID22 Conference
Number43
LocationCopenhagen Business School
Country/TerritoryDenmark
CityFrederiksberg
Period13/06/202215/06/2022
Internet address

Keywords

  • Patent disclosure
  • Patent examination
  • Follow-on innovation

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