Smart Contracts: Reducing Risks in Economic Exchange with No-party Trust?

Helen Eenmaa-Dimitrieva, Maria Jose Schmidt-Kessen

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Our study on smart contracts, self-executing agreements based on blockchain technology, can be placed in the field of inquiry within law and economics of contracts which explores new modes of contract enforcement as sources of market creation. We lay the foundations by characterising contract enforcement and trust mechanisms underlying contracts. Considering that trust reduces risks in economic exchange, we explain how the particular trust mechanism underlying smart contracts’ enforcement (no-party trust) provides opportunities for creating new markets and changing existing ones. We explore, among other things, whether using smart contracts could be a path to increasing the autonomy of consumers and offering a solution for democratising trade.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Journal of Risk Regulation
Volume10
Issue number2
Pages (from-to)245-262
Number of pages18
ISSN1867-299X
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2019

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