Short-sale Constraints and Credit Runs

Gyuri Venter

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies how short-sale constraints affect the informational efficiency of market prices and the link between prices and economic activity. I show that under short-sale constraints security prices contain less information. However, short-sale constraints increase the informativeness of prices to some agents who learn about the quality of an investment opportunity from market prices and have additional private information.
Then I apply this observation when modeling a run on an investment bank by its short-term creditors, who are endowed with dispersed information and also learn from the price of an asset the bank holds. I show that short-selling constraints in the financial market lead to the revival of self-fulfilling beliefs about the beliefs and actions of others, and create multiple equilibria. In the equilibrium where agents rely more on public information (i.e., the price), creditors with high private signals are more lenient to roll over debt, and a bank with lower asset quality remains solvent. This leads to higher allocative efficiency in the real economy. My result thus implies that the decrease in average informativeness due to short-sale constraints can be more than compensated by an increase in informativeness to some agents.
Original languageEnglish
Publication dateDec 2015
Number of pages53
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2015
Event27th CEPR European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets. ESSFM 2016 - Study Center Gerzensee (Swiss National Bank), Gerzensee, Switzerland
Duration: 18 Jul 201627 Jul 2016
Conference number: 27
http://cepr.org/5650

Conference

Conference27th CEPR European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets. ESSFM 2016
Number27
LocationStudy Center Gerzensee (Swiss National Bank)
CountrySwitzerland
CityGerzensee
Period18/07/201627/07/2016
Internet address

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Short-sale constraints
  • Coordination
  • Complementarities
  • Efficiency

Cite this

Venter, G. (2015). Short-sale Constraints and Credit Runs. Paper presented at 27th CEPR European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets. ESSFM 2016, Gerzensee, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2821091
Venter, Gyuri. / Short-sale Constraints and Credit Runs. Paper presented at 27th CEPR European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets. ESSFM 2016, Gerzensee, Switzerland.53 p.
@conference{ff69611fa9d249618ca3319f8442e854,
title = "Short-sale Constraints and Credit Runs",
abstract = "This paper studies how short-sale constraints affect the informational efficiency of market prices and the link between prices and economic activity. I show that under short-sale constraints security prices contain less information. However, short-sale constraints increase the informativeness of prices to some agents who learn about the quality of an investment opportunity from market prices and have additional private information.Then I apply this observation when modeling a run on an investment bank by its short-term creditors, who are endowed with dispersed information and also learn from the price of an asset the bank holds. I show that short-selling constraints in the financial market lead to the revival of self-fulfilling beliefs about the beliefs and actions of others, and create multiple equilibria. In the equilibrium where agents rely more on public information (i.e., the price), creditors with high private signals are more lenient to roll over debt, and a bank with lower asset quality remains solvent. This leads to higher allocative efficiency in the real economy. My result thus implies that the decrease in average informativeness due to short-sale constraints can be more than compensated by an increase in informativeness to some agents.",
keywords = "Asymmetric information, Short-sale constraints, Coordination, Complementarities, Efficiency, Asymmetric information, Short-sale constraints, Coordination, Complementarities, Efficiency",
author = "Gyuri Venter",
year = "2015",
month = "12",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.2821091",
language = "English",
note = "null ; Conference date: 18-07-2016 Through 27-07-2016",
url = "http://cepr.org/5650",

}

Venter, G 2015, 'Short-sale Constraints and Credit Runs' Paper presented at, Gerzensee, Switzerland, 18/07/2016 - 27/07/2016, . https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2821091

Short-sale Constraints and Credit Runs. / Venter, Gyuri.

2015. Paper presented at 27th CEPR European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets. ESSFM 2016, Gerzensee, Switzerland.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

TY - CONF

T1 - Short-sale Constraints and Credit Runs

AU - Venter, Gyuri

PY - 2015/12

Y1 - 2015/12

N2 - This paper studies how short-sale constraints affect the informational efficiency of market prices and the link between prices and economic activity. I show that under short-sale constraints security prices contain less information. However, short-sale constraints increase the informativeness of prices to some agents who learn about the quality of an investment opportunity from market prices and have additional private information.Then I apply this observation when modeling a run on an investment bank by its short-term creditors, who are endowed with dispersed information and also learn from the price of an asset the bank holds. I show that short-selling constraints in the financial market lead to the revival of self-fulfilling beliefs about the beliefs and actions of others, and create multiple equilibria. In the equilibrium where agents rely more on public information (i.e., the price), creditors with high private signals are more lenient to roll over debt, and a bank with lower asset quality remains solvent. This leads to higher allocative efficiency in the real economy. My result thus implies that the decrease in average informativeness due to short-sale constraints can be more than compensated by an increase in informativeness to some agents.

AB - This paper studies how short-sale constraints affect the informational efficiency of market prices and the link between prices and economic activity. I show that under short-sale constraints security prices contain less information. However, short-sale constraints increase the informativeness of prices to some agents who learn about the quality of an investment opportunity from market prices and have additional private information.Then I apply this observation when modeling a run on an investment bank by its short-term creditors, who are endowed with dispersed information and also learn from the price of an asset the bank holds. I show that short-selling constraints in the financial market lead to the revival of self-fulfilling beliefs about the beliefs and actions of others, and create multiple equilibria. In the equilibrium where agents rely more on public information (i.e., the price), creditors with high private signals are more lenient to roll over debt, and a bank with lower asset quality remains solvent. This leads to higher allocative efficiency in the real economy. My result thus implies that the decrease in average informativeness due to short-sale constraints can be more than compensated by an increase in informativeness to some agents.

KW - Asymmetric information

KW - Short-sale constraints

KW - Coordination

KW - Complementarities

KW - Efficiency

KW - Asymmetric information

KW - Short-sale constraints

KW - Coordination

KW - Complementarities

KW - Efficiency

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.2821091

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.2821091

M3 - Paper

ER -

Venter G. Short-sale Constraints and Credit Runs. 2015. Paper presented at 27th CEPR European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets. ESSFM 2016, Gerzensee, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2821091