Self-Disclosure at International Cartels

Steffen Brenner

    Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

    Abstract

    We study revelation behavior at illegal international cartels. Our hypotheses suggest that a resource advantage induces executives of large multinational enterprises (MNEs) to be more likely to reveal the cartel and to cooperate with the antitrust agency during the prosecution stage. Moreover, we expect the cultural background to influence the firm's inclination to reveal incriminating evidence. Empirical tests based on data about cartel breakdowns under the EU Leniency Program show that large MNEs are indeed more likely to reveal the cartel. However, they largely fail to explain variation in legal actions along cultural dimensions.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalJournal of International Business Studies
    Volume42
    Issue number2
    Pages (from-to)221-234
    ISSN0047-2506
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2011

    Keywords

    • Legal Astuteness
    • Cross-border Competition
    • Cartels
    • Nested Data Structure

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