Within the public sector, many institutions are either steered by governance by targets or result-based governance. The former sets up quantitative internal production targets, while the latter advocates that production is planned according to outcomes which are defined as institution-produced effects on individuals or businesses in society; effects which are often produced by ‘nudging’ the citizenry in a certain direction. With point of departure in these two governance-systems, the paper explores a case of controversial inspection of businesses’ negative VAT accounts and it describes the performance measure that guides the inspectors’ inspection (or nudging) of the businesses. The analysis shows that although a result-based governance system is advocated on a strategic level, performance measures which are not ‘result-based’ are developed and used in the daily coordination of work. The paper explores how and why this state of affairs appears and problematizes the widespread use of result-based governance and nudging-techniques by public sector institutions.
|Publication status||Published - 2014|
|Event||XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology 2014: Facing an Unequal World: Challenges for Global Sociology - Yokohama, Japan|
Duration: 13 Jul 2014 → 19 Jul 2014
Conference number: 18
|Conference||XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology 2014|
|Period||13/07/2014 → 19/07/2014|