Redistributive Politics in a Political Union

The Case of the EU

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

    Abstract

    One of the main functions of centralized budgets in federal and political unions is to act as an equalizing mechanism to support economic cohesion. This is also the case with the European Union’s budget, which operates as a redistributive mechanism that counteracts the cross-national and cross-regional inequalities created by the single market. Despite the fact that the principle of ‘juste retour’ has traditionally limited the redistributive capacity of the EU, the net fiscal position of member states - what they pay to the EU budget minus what they receive from it - is very diverse, and has changed quite remarkably over the last decades. In this paper, we investigate how and why the net fiscal position of each member state towards the rest of the EU changes over time. Using a novel panel dataset (1979-2014), we study how some key national and EU-level political and economic variables affect the EU redistributive dynamics. We find that the relative wealth of a country vis-à-vis the other EU countries is a powerful factor in explaining its net fiscal position, but the change in the relative wealth of a country over time has little effect on its position as net contributor or net beneficiary. In addition, we find that the political orientation of national governments does not per se influence redistributive politics with in the EU. However, when the unemployment rate is rising, right-wing governments are able to extract significantly larger budgetary benefits.
    Original languageEnglish
    Publication date2017
    Number of pages18
    Publication statusPublished - 2017
    EventThe 7th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association - Palazzo delle Stelline, Milano, Italy
    Duration: 22 Jun 201724 Jun 2017
    Conference number: 7
    http://www.epsanet.org/conference-2017/

    Conference

    ConferenceThe 7th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association
    Number7
    LocationPalazzo delle Stelline
    CountryItaly
    CityMilano
    Period22/06/201724/06/2017
    Internet address

    Bibliographical note

    CBS Library does not have access to the material

    Cite this

    Citi, M., & Justesen, M. K. (2017). Redistributive Politics in a Political Union: The Case of the EU. Paper presented at The 7th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, Milano, Italy.
    Citi, Manuele ; Justesen, Mogens Kamp. / Redistributive Politics in a Political Union : The Case of the EU. Paper presented at The 7th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, Milano, Italy.18 p.
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    Citi, M & Justesen, MK 2017, 'Redistributive Politics in a Political Union: The Case of the EU' Paper presented at, Milano, Italy, 22/06/2017 - 24/06/2017, .

    Redistributive Politics in a Political Union : The Case of the EU. / Citi, Manuele; Justesen, Mogens Kamp.

    2017. Paper presented at The 7th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, Milano, Italy.

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

    TY - CONF

    T1 - Redistributive Politics in a Political Union

    T2 - The Case of the EU

    AU - Citi, Manuele

    AU - Justesen, Mogens Kamp

    N1 - CBS Library does not have access to the material

    PY - 2017

    Y1 - 2017

    N2 - One of the main functions of centralized budgets in federal and political unions is to act as an equalizing mechanism to support economic cohesion. This is also the case with the European Union’s budget, which operates as a redistributive mechanism that counteracts the cross-national and cross-regional inequalities created by the single market. Despite the fact that the principle of ‘juste retour’ has traditionally limited the redistributive capacity of the EU, the net fiscal position of member states - what they pay to the EU budget minus what they receive from it - is very diverse, and has changed quite remarkably over the last decades. In this paper, we investigate how and why the net fiscal position of each member state towards the rest of the EU changes over time. Using a novel panel dataset (1979-2014), we study how some key national and EU-level political and economic variables affect the EU redistributive dynamics. We find that the relative wealth of a country vis-à-vis the other EU countries is a powerful factor in explaining its net fiscal position, but the change in the relative wealth of a country over time has little effect on its position as net contributor or net beneficiary. In addition, we find that the political orientation of national governments does not per se influence redistributive politics with in the EU. However, when the unemployment rate is rising, right-wing governments are able to extract significantly larger budgetary benefits.

    AB - One of the main functions of centralized budgets in federal and political unions is to act as an equalizing mechanism to support economic cohesion. This is also the case with the European Union’s budget, which operates as a redistributive mechanism that counteracts the cross-national and cross-regional inequalities created by the single market. Despite the fact that the principle of ‘juste retour’ has traditionally limited the redistributive capacity of the EU, the net fiscal position of member states - what they pay to the EU budget minus what they receive from it - is very diverse, and has changed quite remarkably over the last decades. In this paper, we investigate how and why the net fiscal position of each member state towards the rest of the EU changes over time. Using a novel panel dataset (1979-2014), we study how some key national and EU-level political and economic variables affect the EU redistributive dynamics. We find that the relative wealth of a country vis-à-vis the other EU countries is a powerful factor in explaining its net fiscal position, but the change in the relative wealth of a country over time has little effect on its position as net contributor or net beneficiary. In addition, we find that the political orientation of national governments does not per se influence redistributive politics with in the EU. However, when the unemployment rate is rising, right-wing governments are able to extract significantly larger budgetary benefits.

    M3 - Paper

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    Citi M, Justesen MK. Redistributive Politics in a Political Union: The Case of the EU. 2017. Paper presented at The 7th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, Milano, Italy.