Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?

Anette Boom*, Sebastian Schwenen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearch

Abstract

We examine welfare effects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with final consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.
Original languageEnglish
Publication date2018
Number of pages39
Publication statusPublished - 2018
EventVII International Academic Symposium: Smart Energy Systems from a New Energy Policy Approach - Parc Científic de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
Duration: 5 Feb 20195 Feb 2019
Conference number: 7
https://ieb.ub.edu/en/event/vii-international-academic-symposium/

Conference

ConferenceVII International Academic Symposium
Number7
LocationParc Científic de Barcelona
CountrySpain
CityBarcelona
Period05/02/201905/02/2019
Internet address

Bibliographical note

CBS Library does not have access to the material

Keywords

  • Electricity
  • Real-time pricing
  • Market power
  • Efficiency

Cite this

Boom, A., & Schwenen, S. (2018). Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?. Paper presented at VII International Academic Symposium, Barcelona, Spain.
Boom, Anette ; Schwenen, Sebastian. / Real-time Pricing in Power Markets : Who Gains?. Paper presented at VII International Academic Symposium, Barcelona, Spain.39 p.
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abstract = "We examine welfare effects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with final consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.",
keywords = "Electricity, Real-time pricing, Market power, Efficiency, Electricity, Real-time pricing, Market power, Efficiency",
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Boom, A & Schwenen, S 2018, 'Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?' Paper presented at, Barcelona, Spain, 05/02/2019 - 05/02/2019, .

Real-time Pricing in Power Markets : Who Gains? / Boom, Anette; Schwenen, Sebastian.

2018. Paper presented at VII International Academic Symposium, Barcelona, Spain.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearch

TY - CONF

T1 - Real-time Pricing in Power Markets

T2 - Who Gains?

AU - Boom, Anette

AU - Schwenen, Sebastian

N1 - CBS Library does not have access to the material

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - We examine welfare effects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with final consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.

AB - We examine welfare effects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with final consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.

KW - Electricity

KW - Real-time pricing

KW - Market power

KW - Efficiency

KW - Electricity

KW - Real-time pricing

KW - Market power

KW - Efficiency

M3 - Paper

ER -

Boom A, Schwenen S. Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?. 2018. Paper presented at VII International Academic Symposium, Barcelona, Spain.