Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?

Anette Boom, Sebastian Schwenen

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We examine welfare eects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with nal consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand
case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.
Original languageEnglish
Publication date2011
Number of pages38
Publication statusPublished - 2011
EventJahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012 - Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany
Duration: 9 Sep 201212 Sep 2012
http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/325378.html

Conference

ConferenceJahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012
LocationGeorg-August-Universität Göttingen
CountryGermany
CityGöttingen
Period09/09/201212/09/2012
Internet address

Cite this

Boom, A., & Schwenen, S. (2011). Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?. Paper presented at Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012, Göttingen, Germany. http://hdl.handle.net/10398/8610