R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights

Dirk Czarnitzki, Katrin Hussinger, Cédric Schneider

Research output: Working paperResearch

Abstract

Patent pendencies create uncertainty in research and development (R&D) collaboration agreements, resulting in a threat of expropriation of unprotected knowledge by potential partners, reduced bargaining power and enhanced search costs. In this paper, we show that - depending of the type of partner - uncertain intellectual property rights (IPR) lead to reduced collaboration between firms and may hinder the production of knowledge. This has implications for technology policy as R&D collaborations are exempt from anti-trust legislation in order to increase R&D in the economy. We argue that a functional IPR system is needed for successful utilization of this policy.
Patent pendencies create uncertainty in research and development (R&D) collaboration agreements, resulting in a threat of expropriation of unprotected knowledge by potential partners, reduced bargaining power and enhanced search costs. In this paper, we show that - depending of the type of partner - uncertain intellectual property rights (IPR) lead to reduced collaboration between firms and may hinder the production of knowledge. This has implications for technology policy as R&D collaborations are exempt from anti-trust legislation in order to increase R&D in the economy. We argue that a functional IPR system is needed for successful utilization of this policy.
LanguageEnglish
PublisherSSRN: Social Science Research Network
Number of pages29
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
SeriesZEW Discussion Papers
Number11-010

Keywords

    Cite this

    Czarnitzki, D., Hussinger, K., & Schneider, C. (2011). R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights. SSRN: Social Science Research Network. ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 11-010, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1759438
    Czarnitzki, Dirk ; Hussinger, Katrin ; Schneider, Cédric. / R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights. SSRN: Social Science Research Network, 2011. (ZEW Discussion Papers; No. 11-010).
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    Czarnitzki, D, Hussinger, K & Schneider, C 2011 'R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights' SSRN: Social Science Research Network. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1759438

    R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights. / Czarnitzki, Dirk; Hussinger, Katrin; Schneider, Cédric.

    SSRN: Social Science Research Network, 2011.

    Research output: Working paperResearch

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    Czarnitzki D, Hussinger K, Schneider C. R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights. SSRN: Social Science Research Network. 2011. Available from, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1759438