Abstract
Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publication date | 2014 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
| Event | The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014 - Northwestern Law Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth, Chicago, IL, United States Duration: 11 Apr 2014 → 13 Apr 2014 Conference number: 12 http://editorialexpress.com/conference/IIOC2014/program/IIOC2014.html |
Conference
| Conference | The 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. IIOC 2014 |
|---|---|
| Number | 12 |
| Location | Northwestern Law Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth |
| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Chicago, IL |
| Period | 11/04/2014 → 13/04/2014 |
| Internet address |