Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.
Original languageEnglish
Publication date2015
Number of pages32
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Event10th International Conference on Competition and Regulation: Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation - Rethymnon, Greece
Duration: 5 Jul 20157 Jul 2015
Conference number: 10
http://www.cresse.info/default.aspx?articleID=5710

Conference

Conference10th International Conference on Competition and Regulation
Number10
CountryGreece
CityRethymnon
Period05/07/201507/07/2015
Internet address

Keywords

  • Electricity
  • Capacity markets
  • Price regulation

Cite this

Boom, A. (2015). Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. Paper presented at 10th International Conference on Competition and Regulation, Rethymnon, Greece.
Boom, Anette. / Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. Paper presented at 10th International Conference on Competition and Regulation, Rethymnon, Greece.32 p.
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Boom, A 2015, 'Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction' Paper presented at, Rethymnon, Greece, 05/07/2015 - 07/07/2015, .

Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. / Boom, Anette.

2015. Paper presented at 10th International Conference on Competition and Regulation, Rethymnon, Greece.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

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AU - Boom, Anette

PY - 2015

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N2 - Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.

AB - Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.

KW - Electricity

KW - Capacity markets

KW - Price regulation

KW - Electricity

KW - Capacity markets

KW - Price regulation

M3 - Paper

ER -

Boom A. Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction. 2015. Paper presented at 10th International Conference on Competition and Regulation, Rethymnon, Greece.