Abstract
Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small firms.
| Original language | English |
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| Publication date | 2014 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
| Event | The 9th Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization. NORIO 2014 - University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway Duration: 2 Jun 2014 → 3 Jun 2014 Conference number: 9 http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/news-and-events/events/conferences/2014/dokumenter/programme.html |
Workshop
| Workshop | The 9th Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization. NORIO 2014 |
|---|---|
| Number | 9 |
| Location | University of Oslo |
| Country/Territory | Norway |
| City | Oslo |
| Period | 02/06/2014 → 03/06/2014 |
| Internet address |