Platform Contracting With Developers: Reconsiderung the "Control vs. Enable" Decision of Platforms from an Implementation Perspective

Anette Boom, Wolfgang Gick

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Platform intermediaries recur to the use of specific contractual forms when hiring developers. We study such contracts in a market model with a monopoly platform and a continuum of consumers and focus on multi-agent contracting under adverse selection on the developer side. Transfer discrimination between developers is possible but potentially limited. There is a development stage with ex-ante contracting. Two distinct types of implementation emerge: under Bayesian Implementation, higher information rents lead to more distortions. In turn, Dominant Strategy Implementation enables first-best production sharing under joint quality determination between the developers. As we bring two theoretical concepts to the analysis of two-sided platforms, our paper sheds new light on the nature of contractual relationships between a platform and multiple developers, so expanding the formal study of two-sided platforms beyond pricing.
Platform intermediaries recur to the use of specific contractual forms when hiring developers. We study such contracts in a market model with a monopoly platform and a continuum of consumers and focus on multi-agent contracting under adverse selection on the developer side. Transfer discrimination between developers is possible but potentially limited. There is a development stage with ex-ante contracting. Two distinct types of implementation emerge: under Bayesian Implementation, higher information rents lead to more distortions. In turn, Dominant Strategy Implementation enables first-best production sharing under joint quality determination between the developers. As we bring two theoretical concepts to the analysis of two-sided platforms, our paper sheds new light on the nature of contractual relationships between a platform and multiple developers, so expanding the formal study of two-sided platforms beyond pricing.

Conference

ConferenceAnnual Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik 2018
LocationUniversity of Freiburg
CountryGermany
CityFreiburg im Breisgau
Period02/09/201805/09/2018
Internet address

Bibliographical note

CBS Library does not have access to the material

Keywords

  • Multi-agent contracting
  • Limited transfer discrimination
  • Bayesian vs. dominant strategy implementation
  • Ex-ante contracting
  • Information gathering

Cite this

Boom, A., & Gick, W. (2018). Platform Contracting With Developers: Reconsiderung the "Control vs. Enable" Decision of Platforms from an Implementation Perspective. Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik 2018, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany.
Boom, Anette ; Gick, Wolfgang. / Platform Contracting With Developers : Reconsiderung the "Control vs. Enable" Decision of Platforms from an Implementation Perspective. Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik 2018, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany.26 p.
@conference{a909b4bdfa234bc28d927da0026b9180,
title = "Platform Contracting With Developers: Reconsiderung the {"}Control vs. Enable{"} Decision of Platforms from an Implementation Perspective",
abstract = "Platform intermediaries recur to the use of specific contractual forms when hiring developers. We study such contracts in a market model with a monopoly platform and a continuum of consumers and focus on multi-agent contracting under adverse selection on the developer side. Transfer discrimination between developers is possible but potentially limited. There is a development stage with ex-ante contracting. Two distinct types of implementation emerge: under Bayesian Implementation, higher information rents lead to more distortions. In turn, Dominant Strategy Implementation enables first-best production sharing under joint quality determination between the developers. As we bring two theoretical concepts to the analysis of two-sided platforms, our paper sheds new light on the nature of contractual relationships between a platform and multiple developers, so expanding the formal study of two-sided platforms beyond pricing.",
keywords = "Multi-agent contracting, Limited transfer discrimination, Bayesian vs. dominant strategy implementation, Ex-ante contracting, Information gathering, Multi-agent contracting, Limited transfer discrimination, Bayesian vs. dominant strategy implementation, Ex-ante contracting, Information gathering",
author = "Anette Boom and Wolfgang Gick",
note = "CBS Library does not have access to the material; Annual Meeting of the Verein f{\"u}r Socialpolitik 2018 : Digital Economy ; Conference date: 02-09-2018 Through 05-09-2018",
year = "2018",
language = "English",
url = "https://www.socialpolitik.de/De/jahrestagung-2018, https://www.eucken.de/veranstaltungen-s/vfs-2018/",

}

Boom, A & Gick, W 2018, 'Platform Contracting With Developers: Reconsiderung the "Control vs. Enable" Decision of Platforms from an Implementation Perspective' Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik 2018, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, 02/09/2018 - 05/09/2018, .

Platform Contracting With Developers : Reconsiderung the "Control vs. Enable" Decision of Platforms from an Implementation Perspective. / Boom, Anette; Gick, Wolfgang.

2018. Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik 2018, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearchpeer-review

TY - CONF

T1 - Platform Contracting With Developers

T2 - Reconsiderung the "Control vs. Enable" Decision of Platforms from an Implementation Perspective

AU - Boom,Anette

AU - Gick,Wolfgang

N1 - CBS Library does not have access to the material

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Platform intermediaries recur to the use of specific contractual forms when hiring developers. We study such contracts in a market model with a monopoly platform and a continuum of consumers and focus on multi-agent contracting under adverse selection on the developer side. Transfer discrimination between developers is possible but potentially limited. There is a development stage with ex-ante contracting. Two distinct types of implementation emerge: under Bayesian Implementation, higher information rents lead to more distortions. In turn, Dominant Strategy Implementation enables first-best production sharing under joint quality determination between the developers. As we bring two theoretical concepts to the analysis of two-sided platforms, our paper sheds new light on the nature of contractual relationships between a platform and multiple developers, so expanding the formal study of two-sided platforms beyond pricing.

AB - Platform intermediaries recur to the use of specific contractual forms when hiring developers. We study such contracts in a market model with a monopoly platform and a continuum of consumers and focus on multi-agent contracting under adverse selection on the developer side. Transfer discrimination between developers is possible but potentially limited. There is a development stage with ex-ante contracting. Two distinct types of implementation emerge: under Bayesian Implementation, higher information rents lead to more distortions. In turn, Dominant Strategy Implementation enables first-best production sharing under joint quality determination between the developers. As we bring two theoretical concepts to the analysis of two-sided platforms, our paper sheds new light on the nature of contractual relationships between a platform and multiple developers, so expanding the formal study of two-sided platforms beyond pricing.

KW - Multi-agent contracting

KW - Limited transfer discrimination

KW - Bayesian vs. dominant strategy implementation

KW - Ex-ante contracting

KW - Information gathering

KW - Multi-agent contracting

KW - Limited transfer discrimination

KW - Bayesian vs. dominant strategy implementation

KW - Ex-ante contracting

KW - Information gathering

M3 - Paper

ER -

Boom A, Gick W. Platform Contracting With Developers: Reconsiderung the "Control vs. Enable" Decision of Platforms from an Implementation Perspective. 2018. Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik 2018, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany.