Path Dependency and Governance in German Family Firms

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Abstract

Dynastic family businesses pursue a double aim. They strive for economic success and attempt to shield the family's longterm influence against outsiders. As a consequence, their choice of governance reflects an idiosyncratic balance between remaining independent and tapping into the opportunities of the market. Autonomy-oriented “closed” governance can lead to problems in integrating external capital and knowledge. More market-oriented “open” governance can make a firm more vulnerable to outside influence. German family firms have struck a balance between the two models since the mid-nineteenth century. Their choice of governance is a response to the challenges and opportunities of the environment, and at various times they are influenced by corporate law, alternative finance options, and inheritance law.
Original languageEnglish
JournalBusiness History Review
Volume85
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)699-724
ISSN0007-6805
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes

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